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Baseball is an integral part of America’s social fabric, and as such, it 
has always reflected the language of America. In this time of 
globalization, when corporations are criticized for exploiting cheap 
sources of labor in developing countries, the exploitative nature of Major 
League Baseball’s (“MLB”) recruiting practices in Latin America seem 
to be overlooked. While the wealth of talent coming from Latin America 
demonstrates its importance to MLB, MLB has failed to adequately 
address the issues facing Latin American recruits. Even though MLB is 
not responsible for the socioeconomic inequalities that place it in a 
better bargaining position, MLB should be held accountable for the 
exploitative nature of its practices.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine risking everything you had to have your value appraised by a 
scout in a foreign country. After receiving the appraisal, you wait for 
someone to purchase your freedom at the expense of a percentage of 
your future earnings. This is the story of many Latin American players 
who travel to the United States in hopes of playing professional baseball. 
Depending on the player’s country of origin, the risk is even greater. For 
example, given the tempestuous relationship between the United States 
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and Cuba,1 players defecting from Cuba face an especially challenging 
odyssey fraught with peril for the possibility of playing professional 
baseball in the United States. Cuban baseball hopefuls had to defect from 
Cuba before they could enter the U.S.2
In 2014, the story of Yasiel Puig’s journey from Cuba to the Los 
Angeles Dodgers captivated millions of baseball fans.3 Despite past 
failed attempts to defect to the United States, clandestine plans were 
formed to extract Puig and three others from the island.4 Established in 
1960, the United States trade embargo against Cuba restricted almost all 
exportations, and later importations, of goods, excluding some foods and 
medicine.5 This included prohibiting American entities, like Major 
League Baseball, from conducting business with Cuban nationals or 
hiring them unless they first defected, and essentially renounced their 
Cuban citizenship.6 While this may seem like a small obstacle to some, 
for a chance to live their dreams, the political relationship between the 
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           1. See Danielle Renwick et al., U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http:/www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113; see also Maria Cardona, Celebrate
New Day for U.S-Cuba Relations, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/14/opinions
/cardona-cuba-relations/ (stating that in December 2014, President Obama announced a 
plan to reestablish relations with Cuba after five decades since the Cuban trade embargo. 
Although the U.S. reopened its embassy in Cuba in 2015, only Congress can end the 
embargo, which is uncertain considering Congress has heavily opposed the Obama 
administration).
 2. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 6021–91 (1996).  
 3. See Scott Eden, No One Walks Off the Island, ESPN (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/10781144/no-one-walks-island-los-angeles-
dodgers-yasiel-puig-journey-cuba. 
 4. Id.
 5. In 1960, Cuba signed an agreement to buy oil from the Soviet Union. 
However, when U.S.- owned oil refineries would not process the oil, Castro seized them. 
The U.S. responded by limiting Cuba’s import on sugar, and eventually implementing an 
embargo against Cuba and cutting all diplomatic ties. Cuban Foreign Relations, WILSON
CTR., http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115140 (last visited Apr. 2, 2016); 
Timeline: Post-Revolution Cuba, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/castro/timeline/ 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017).  
 6. Eden, supra note 3. 
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United States and Cuba made it nearly impossible for players defecting 
to the United States to return home.7
Many foreign athletes are lured to North America with hopes of 
playing the game they love and receiving large sums of money for it.8
However, many players are brought to the United States and find 
themselves entirely dependent on their scouts.9 These players find 
themselves in a foreign country illegally with no support system.10 While 
MLB has acknowledged the challenges endured by Latin American 
athletes, it has done little to adequately address the problems.11
This note is an analysis of MLB’s policies and practices regarding 
recruitment in Latin America. It will analyze the challenges that Latin 
American prospects encounter, such as labor and contract issues, and 
examine how MLB has attempted to level the playing field between the 
players, clubs, and scouts. Despite MLB forming committees and 
implementing rules governing recruitment in Latin American countries, 
the integrity of the game is still compromised, as is evident by multiple 
investigations in 2014 involving Cuban smuggling rings. The issue 
surrounding the recruitment of Latin American players is whether 
MLB’s interests can be promoted while protecting players’ interests, 
without sacrificing freedom of contract. The purpose of this note is to 
suggest ways in which the federal government can collaborate with MLB 
to develop better recruiting practices in Latin American countries.  
As an integral part of America’s social fabric, baseball has been 
linked to the cultural ideal of Americanism.12 However, the 2015 
 7. Id.
 8. Samuel O. Regalado, “Latin Players on the Cheap:” Professional Baseball 
Recruitment in Latin America and the Neocolonialist Tradition, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD . 9, 13 (2000) (discussing how baseball is rooted in America’s historical 
exploitation of Latin America). 
 9. Kavitha A. Davidson, African Victims of Basketball’s Global Push,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 19, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2015-03-19/african-victims-of-basketball-s-global-push.
 10. See id.
 11. Arturo J. Marcano & David P. Fidler, Baseball’s Exploitation of Latin Talent,
NACLA, https://nacla.org/article/baseballs-exploitation-latin-talent (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016).
 12. See Ira Berkow, What is Baseball’s Meaning and Its Effect on America, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/31/sports/what-is-baseball-s-
meaning-and-its-effect- on-america.html?pagewanted=all.  
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Opening Day roster showed that 26.5% of players were born outside of 
the United States and its territories.13 Of that percentage, the majority of 
players are from Latin American countries.14 As the number of Latin 
American baseball players increases, the less MLB can ignore the 
exploitation employed by its clubs to recruit these players.15 The 
globalization of baseball evidences just how critical Latin American 
talent is to MLB’s economic system.16
II. GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL
Prior to the integration with the Negro Baseball League, Caucasian 
athletes were the sole participants in MLB.17 However, as baseball 
globalized, it became more culturally diverse and Latin America 
developed into a goldmine for major league recruiting.18 Today, some of 
the most prominent up and coming players are from Latin America.19
A. History of American Baseball  
Baseball is America’s beloved pastime.20 Abner Doubleday, a New 
Yorker, was mistakenly credited with inventing the game in 1839.21
However, the origins of baseball date back to the 18th century with 
English games like rounders and cricket.22 Baseball became more 
popular in industrialized cities during the American Revolution.23 The 
 13. Press Release, Major League Baseball, Opening Day Rosters Feature 230 
Players Born Outside the U.S. (Apr. 6, 2015). 
 14. See id.
 15. See generally Marcano & Fidler, supra note 11. 
 16. Id.
 17. See Steven Goldman, Segregated Baseball: A Kaleidoscopic Review, MLB, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/mlb_negro_leagues_story.jsp?story=kaleidoscopic (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2016).  
 18. See Regalado, supra note 8, at 9. 
 19. See Eden, supra note 3.  
 20. See Berkow, supra note 12. 
 21. Who Invented Baseball?, HIST. (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/who-invented-baseball.  
 22. Id.
 23. Id.
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game was introduced in Cuba in the late 1800s, where it gained instant 
popularity and spread throughout Central America and the Caribbean.24
The first players union in baseball was formed in 1885 in response to 
baseball’s reserve clause25 and the growing movement to cap players’ 
salaries.26 Proving unsuccessful, later attempts to organize players were 
made in 1900 with the Players’ Protective Association, in 1912 with the 
Fraternity of Professional Baseball Players of America, and in 1946 with 
the American Baseball Guild.27 However, none of the efforts were 
sufficient to end the reserve clause.28 In 1968, the players regrouped and 
organized the Major League Baseball Players Association (the 
“MLBPA”).29 That same year, the MLBPA negotiated its first Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).30 This milestone was critical to the 
advent of free agency rights.31
In an effort to combat free agency and restrict salary growth, baseball 
clubs sought to limit players’ rights to sign with another club at the 
expiration of their individual contracts.32 From 1985 to 1987, baseball 
club owners collectively decided not to pursue free agents.33 In 1988, 
 24. See Roberto González Echevarría, Latin Americans in Major League 
Baseball Through the First Years of the 21st Century, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Latin-Americans-in-Major-League-Baseball-910675 
(last updated Nov. 4, 2009).   
 25. The reserve clause was a clause in baseball players’ contract that stated at the 
contract’s expiration, the rights to the player remained with the team, meaning that the 
player was not free to contract with another team. Reserve Clause, BASEBALL 
REFERENCE, http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Reserve_clause (last updated 
Nov. 30, 2012).  
 26. Our History, MLBPLAYERS, http://www.mlbplayers.com/ 
ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=211042995&DB_OEM_ID=34000 (last visited Feb. 11, 
2016) [hereinafter MLBPA History]. 
 27. Id.
 28. Id.
 29. Id.; MLBPA Info, MLBPLAYERS, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/cba.jsp (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter MLBPA Info].  
 30. MLBPA Info, supra note 29.  
 31. See id. 
 32. William B. Gould IV, Bargaining, Race, and Globalization: How Baseball 
and Other Sports Mirror Collective Bargaining, Law, and Life, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 14 
(2013).
 33. MLBPA History, supra note 26; Cliff Corcoran, The Strike: Who Was Right, 
Who Was Wrong and How It Helped Baseball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.si.com/mlb/2014/08/12/1994-strike-bud-selig-orel-hershiser.  
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club owners began sharing player information to restrain salaries, which 
led to the MLBPA filing grievances against the owners alleging collusion 
between 1986 and 1988.34 Prevailing on all three cases, the parties settled 
for $280 million in 1990.35 Four years later, owners again attempted to 
break the players’ union and reduce pay and benefits, which resulted in a 
232-day strike.36 The strike forced owners to rescind the unilateral 
changes of free agency and salary arbitration.37 Players used labor law as 
an effective means of increasing contractual freedoms.38 The resulting 
1996 CBA brought peace, sustained salary increase, and a search for 
new, cheap talent.39
B. Baseball in Latin America and Major League Baseball’s Search 
for New Talent 
Baseball was first introduced in Lain America in the nineteenth 
century.40 Initially, baseball was seen as a potential way to strengthen 
North-South relations during the time of U.S. foreign military presence 
in Latin America.41 U.S. military occupation and involvement in Latin 
American countries led to servicemen teaching the game to locals.42 In 
the 1880s, Esteban Bellán, also known as Steve Bellán, and Vincent 
Nava, also known as Sandy Nava, became the first two Latin Americans 
to play baseball in the U.S.43 Due to the segregation system, Bellán and 
Nava played under the auspice of Spanish, rather than Cuban and 
 34. MLBPA History, supra note 26.  
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. See Gould, supra note 32, at 14–15. 
 38. See Robert A. McCormick, Baseball’s Third Strike: The Triumph of 
Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (1982).  
 39. Gould, supra note 32, at 15. 
 40. Echevarría, supra note 24.  
 41. See generally JASON TURNER, BASEBALL POLICY, BASEBALL DEPLOYMENT:
THE NATIONAL PASTIME IN U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS (2012), available at 
http://acumen.lib.ua.edu/u0015/0000001/0001115/u0015_0000001_0001115.pdf; see 
also ADRIAN BURGOS JR., PLAYING AMERICA’S GAME: BASEBALL, LATINOS, AND THE 
COLOR LINE 19 (2007). 
 42. BURGOS, supra note 41, at 19–20. 
 43. See id. at 13, 17–18.  
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Mexican.44 Latino players’ entry into the majors depended largely on the 
color of their skin due to racial segregation that baseball leagues 
implemented in the 1880s.45 If the player’s skin was light, he was 
welcomed.46 This system left dark-skinned Latino players with two 
options: (1) play in the Negro Leagues or (2) play on teams in their 
native countries.47
In the late nineteenth century, a transnational baseball circuit 
developed that enabled the spread of the game and a network between 
the U.S. and Latin American baseball leagues and players.48 In addition 
to the attraction of a warmer climate, African American ballplayers were 
also drawn by opportunities in Latin America that were not available in 
the U.S.49 By the 1940s, approximately half of the top African American 
and darker-skinned Cuban ballplayers left the U.S. to play in Latin 
America.50 Once the game became integrated in 1947, the attraction to 
American baseball resurfaced and increased.51 By the time of the 1996 
CBA, the use of litigation, free agency, and collective bargaining enabled 
ballplayers to level the playing field of contract negotiations.52
Ultimately, the tactics employed by ballplayers in the U.S. led MLB to 
expand recruitment to Latin America.53
For scouts, Latin America was essentially an untapped source of 
inexpensive talent.54 Furthermore, labor laws in these regions typically 
favored MLB club owners.55 In the later part of the twentieth century, 
teams established baseball academies, which allowed them to access 
 44. See Brian McKenna, Steve Bellán, SOC’Y FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL,
http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/78dbf37d (last visited Mar. 27, 2017); see also Brian
McKenna, Sandy Nava, SOC’Y FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL, http://sabr.org/bioproj/ 
person/1ac63c02 (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). 
 45. BURGOS, supra note 41, at 5.  
 46. See id. at 6.  
 47. Id. at 9–10. 
 48. Id. at 8. 
 49. Id.
 50. 20th Century, BASEBALL REFERENCE, http://www.baseball-reference.com/
bullpen/20th_Century (last updated Dec. 2013).  
 51. See BURGOS, supra note 41, at 13–14.  
 52. See Gould, supra note 32, at 15.  
 53. Id. at 17.  
 54. Regalado, supra note 8, at 9.  
 55. Id.
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Latin American players before they entered the draft.56 Likewise, Latin 
American players were drawn to the U.S. and Canada with promises of 
tremendous economic opportunities that far surpassed those offered in 
their native lands, and a chance to play professional baseball.57
The treatment of Latin American players as commodities favors the 
neocolonialist tradition of U.S. business practices throughout the 
region.58 For prospective players in Latin America, the recruiting system 
is unstructured and essentially unregulated, as compared to their North 
American and Asian counterparts.59 Thus, the question is whether the 
imbalance of bargaining power between MLB scouts and owners relative 
to Latin American players can be corrected through the collaborative 
work of MLB and government that protects players’ interests in the 
context of recruiting, without the affecting freedom of contract. 
III. REGULATIONS ON FOREIGN RECRUITING
Under the Major League Constitution, the Commissioner has the 
authority to investigate and sanction individual and club infractions.60
 56. See Vanessa Marie Zimmer, Dragging Their Devotion: The Role of 
International Law in Major League Baseball’s Dominican Affairs, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 418, 421 (2005); Id. at 419 (stating that players from Puerto Rico, Canada, and the 
United States are required to be eighteen years old to enter a draft, players from Latin 
American countries are not subject to the same age requirement because they do not enter 
Major League Baseball through the draft); Id. at 421 (stating that to avoid these 
regulations, some teams hide prospects at remote training facilities to prevent the players 
from signing with other teams or finding an agent who would demand an increase in 
payment. Alternatively, some Major League teams violate these regulations outright by 
signing players who are below the age requirement); see also OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF 
BASEBALL, OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK, MLR 3(a)(1)(B). Major 
League Rule 3(a)(1)(B) provides that: “[a] player who has not previously contracted with 
a Major or Minor League Club, who is not a resident of the United States or Canada, and 
who is not subject to the High School, College or Junior College Rules, may be signed to 
a contract if the player: (i) is at least [seventeen] years old at the time of signing, or (ii) is 
[sixteen] at the time of signing, but will attain age [seventeen] prior to September 1 of the 
first season covered by the contract.” 
 57. Regalado, supra note 8, at 9.  
 58. Id. at 11. 
 59. Marcano & Fidler, supra note 11.  
 60. Pursuant to Article II, section 2 of the Major League Constitution, the 
functions of the Commissioner include: 
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The Major League Agreement reinforced this authority, enabling the 
Commissioner to determine what is in the best interest of the game.61
Given the commissioner’s inability to impose legal sanctions, and the 
mild attempts to regulate recruitment in Latin American countries, 
government involvement could lead to heavier consequences for 
violating MLB’s policies.  
In 2011, MLB created the International Talent Committee as part of 
the new Basic Agreement.62 The International Talent Committee is 
responsible for discussing the development and recruitment of 
international athletes.63 In addition to general issues regarding 
international recruitment, the Committee is tasked with determining the 
appropriate age at which international amateur athletes are allowed to 
sign with professional teams.64 Further, the Committee develops effective 
strategies to provide undrafted or unsigned Latin American players with 
an opportunity to continue their development.65 Considering that MLB 
faces varying difficulties recruiting from certain countries, most of the 
“(b) To investigate, either upon complaint or upon the 
Commissioner’s own initiative, any act, transaction or practice 
charged, alleged or suspected to be not in the best interests of the 
national game of Baseball, with authority to summon persons and 
to order the production of documents, and, in case of refusal to 
appear or produce, to impose such penalties as are hereinafter 
provided[;]  
(c) To determine, after investigation, what preventive, remedial 
or punitive action is appropriate in the premises, and to take such 
action either against Major League Clubs or individuals, as the 
case may be.”  
Major League Constitution, IPMall, https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/ 
hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/M
LConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf. 
 61. Id.
 62. Evan Drellich, MLB, Union Form International Talent Committee,
MLB.COM (Dec. 15, 2011), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/26173582/.  
 63. Id.
 64. See id.
 65. Press Release, Major League Baseball Player Association, MLBPA, MLB 
Appoint Members to a Committee to Discuss International Player Acquisition (Dec. 15, 
2011), http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/releases/releases.jsp?content=121511. 
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Committee’s discussions are conducted on a country-by-country basis.66
Despite the Committee’s ambitious agenda, lack of information 
regarding the Committee’s plans and implementations suggests that little 
has been done to combat the long-standing issues surrounding Major 
League Baseball’s recruiting practices in Latin America.67
IV. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S RECRUITMENT ABUSES: CHILD LABOR
AND CONTRACT ISSUES
The socioeconomic inequalities that exist in Latin America constitute 
an important element in analyzing labor exploitations by MLB.68
Recruiting practices in Latin America have created a profitable market in 
young talented players who come from impoverished areas and lack 
good counsel.69 This system risks the opportunity for players to be 
legitimately developed and scouted.70    
A. Child Labor Law and Baseball’s Market for Younger Talent 
Recruits are often under the age of eighteen, so child labor laws are 
particularly relevant to MLB’s recruitment of Latin American players.71
In 1999, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that 
the most serious issue the Dominican Republic faced was children 
dropping out of school to join the workforce.72 Title II of the Labor Code 
of the Dominican Republic prohibits children under the age of fourteen 
from working.73 Despite that provision, the World Bank reported that 
approximately 13% of children ages seven to fourteen have abandoned 
their education to work or do house chores.74 This issue, coupled with the 
poverty level faced by many Latin American families, results in recruits 
 66. Drellich, supra note 62.  
 67. See id. 
 68. See Rob Ruck, Baseball’s Recruitment Abuses, AMERICAS Q. (summer 2011), 
http://americasquarterly.org/node/ 2745. 
 69. Id.
 70. See id.
 71. See id.
 72. Zimmer, supra note 56, at 432.  
 73. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SITUATION OF MINORS IN 
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ch. XI, sec. D. 
 74. Id. at sec. C.  
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being taken of advantage of by shady scouts, which ultimately threatens 
the integrity of baseball.75
MLB has operated baseball academies throughout Latin America for 
years.76 The purpose of these academies is to hone recruits’ skills and 
prepare them for MLB.77 Buscónes, or street agents, operate facilities that 
mimic those operated by MLB clubs.78 Although MLB has yet to 
recognize an official relationship with buscónes, players are often 
unofficially recruited by buscónes and train at their facilities before 
entering MLB baseball academies.79 On the surface, baseball academies 
benefit both MLB and the country in which the academy is located.80 For 
recruits, they are provided with basic necessities and an education that is 
specifically tailored to assist them in adapting to life in America.81 For 
recruits lucky enough to go the major leagues, the system enables them 
to effectively escape poverty.82 However, those not as lucky return home 
without a practical education.83
The wealth of talent coming from Latin America cannot be ignored, 
but neither can the lack of regulation that effectively protects Latin 
American recruits.84 Despite child labor’s integral role in economies 
worldwide, Congress sought to limit it in the U.S. by passing the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in 1938.85 However, like MLB’s aggressive plans, 
federal restrictions on child labor appear “more symbolic than real.”86
 75. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 419.  
 76. Rookie Academy, BASEBALL REFERENCE, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/bullpen/Rookie_Academy (last updated July 4, 2006).  
 77. See id.
 78. Some buscónes-run facilities are better than others, but the primary purpose is 
to hone players’ skills. Little is done to educate players beyond baseball. See Ruck, supra 
note 68; see also Adam Wasch, Children Left Behind: The Effect of Major League 
Baseball on Education in the Dominican Republic, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 99, 
100 (2009) (stating that MLB has invested an estimated seventy-six millions dollars in 
the Dominican Republic and created approximately 2,000 jobs).  
 79. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 423.  
 80. See Wasch, supra note 78, at 101.  
 81. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 423–24.  
 82. See id. at 418.  
 83. See id. at 423–24 .  
 84. See Marcano & Fidler, supra note 11.  
 85. Seymour Moskowitz, Dickens Redux: How American Child Labor Law 
Became a Con Game, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 89, 91 (2010). 
 86. Id. at 92.  
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Further, MLB is accustomed to preferential treatment.87 While baseball 
offers great financial reward potential, it poses immediate and long-term 
threats to players’ education88 and development into a self-sufficient 
adult.89
i. Major League Baseball’s Age Limit Restriction 
In the 1980s, MLB implemented a rule in the Dominican Republic 
that limited baseball organizations’ time with prospective players.90
Baseball organizations were granted an exclusive period of thirty days to 
determine whether they wanted to sign the player.91 At the conclusion of 
the period, if the team decided against signing the player, he would have 
to leave the baseball academy.92 Consequently, baseball academies 
would no longer be able to develop players who were fourteen and 
fifteen-years-old.93 Venezuela adopted this rule some two decades later.94
Previously, a team would train children that young at the team’s facility, 
sometimes for as long as two years, which allowed teams to circumvent 
any rule or regulation that prohibited teams from signing players younger 
than sixteen-years-old.95 MLB did not prohibit organizations from 
training players younger than sixteen at the baseball academies or 
keeping them for an extended period.96
Prior to MLB’s age limit restrictions, baseball organizations 
seemingly had no boundaries in regard to age limit.97 Jim Kelly, who 
 87. See Zimmer, supra note 56 at 425; see also Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. 
Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)(the Supreme Court held that 
“[a]lthough [baseball] competitions between various clubs required extensive and 
frequent travel across state lines of players and officials, such travel was merely 
incidental to the baseball competitions. . . baseball [is] purely a state affair, [and as such], 
the professional baseball business [is] not subject to federal antitrust law.”) 
 88. See MILTON H. JAMAIL, VENEZUELAN BUST BASEBALL BALL BOOM: ANDRES
REINER AND SCOUTING ON THE NEW FRONTIER 100–01 (2008). 
 89. See id. at 104.  
 90. See id. at 101. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 101–02.  
 94. Id. at 101. 
 95. Id. at 102. 
 96. Id. at 101. 
 97. See id. at 102. 
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played shortstop for the Toronto Blue Jays, was only thirteen when he 
was signed in February 1984.98 While the Blue Jays were not particularly 
eager to sign Kelly, the team felt compelled to do so because there were 
multiple other clubs showing interest.99 Although he never made it to the 
major leagues, he was the youngest player to ever sign with a major 
league organization.100 MLB’s rule that prohibited teams from signing 
players under the age of sixteen was known in the industry as the “Jimy 
Kelly Rule.”101 Kelly’s contract with the Toronto Blue Jays effectively 
served as the event that terminated child labor in Latin American 
baseball, and effectively in MLB.102
While players from Puerto Rico, Canada, and the United States are 
required to be eighteen years old to enter a draft, players from Latin 
American countries are not subject to the same age requirement because 
they do not enter Major League Baseball through the draft.103 With 
respect to baseball academies, children in the Dominican Republic can 
enter as young as twelve.104 To avoid MLB’s regulations, some teams 
hide prospects at remote training facilities to prevent the players from 
signing with other teams or finding an agent who would demand an 
increase in payment.105 Alternatively, some Major League teams violate 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.
 100. Id. at 102–03.  
 101. Id. at 103.  
 102. Id.; First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, MLB, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (stating that today, players who are eligible to 
enter the draft are separated into three basic categories: (1) High school players who have 
graduated from high school, but have not attended college or junior (or community) 
college; (2) College players who attend four-year colleges and have either completed 
their junior or senior years or are at least 21-years-old; and (3) Students who attend junior 
(or community) college, regardless of how many years of school they have completed). 
 103. Zimmer, supra note 56, at 419, 420; OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
BASEBALL, supra note 56, at MLR 3(a)(1)(B) (providing that a player who is not under 
contract with a Major League Baseball team and not subject to the draft can be signed to 
any team if (1) he is seventeen years old at the time of signing, or (2) he is at least sixteen 
years old at the time of signing and will be seventeen either by (i) the end of the baseball 
season in which he signed or (ii) September 1 of the year he signs). 
 104. Zimmer, supra note 56, at 421. 
 105. Id. at 420–21. 
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these regulations outright by signing players who are below the age 
requirement.106
ii. Age and Identity Fraud 
To understand the dynamics between MLB and Latin American 
players, there must be an understanding of the recruiting process of Latin 
American players and the profit motive for these players.107 MLB’s rule 
that excludes Latin American players from the draft allows Latin 
American players to start their baseball careers as free agents  and creates 
loopholes for their recruitment.108 Age and identity fraud is a common 
practice among Latin American baseball hopefuls because players desire 
to be more marketable.109 As a survival tactic, players change their names 
and age without a thought because buscónes tell players that major 
league teams will pay more for younger players.110 Athletes are 
encouraged to assume fake identities because clubs may pay a player 
who is sixteen years old $100,000 or more than it would pay a player 
who is just a year older.111 The older the prospect, the more he is 
devalued.112 While the common practice of falsifying documents may 
give the illusion that it is easy to assume a fake identity, or perhaps it is a 
 106. Id. at 420. 
 107. Nicholas Pompeo, DNA To Play: Major League Baseball’s Use of DNA 
Testing on Central and South American Prospects in the Age of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 627, 629–30 (2011).  
 108. Ruck, supra note 68; Free Agency, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal- 
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Free +Agency (last visited Dec. 11, 2015) (defining free 
agency as a “legal status that allows a professional athlete to negotiate an employment 
contract with the team of his or her choosing instead of being confined to one team”). 
 109. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 422.  
 110. Paul Hoynes, The Mystery of Indians Pitcher Roberto Hernandez is a Way of 
Life in Baseball-Mad Dominican Republic, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 25, 2012, 10:35 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/tribe/index.ssf/2012/02/the_mystery_of_indians_pitcher.html.  
 111. Michael O’Keeffe, Miami Marlins Reliever Juan Carlos Oviedo, Formerly 
Known as Leo Nunez, Arrested in Dominican Republic, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011, 
12:15 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseball/ miami-marlins-reliever-juan-
carlos-oviedo-leo-nunez-arrested-dominican-republic-article-1.989179.  
 112. Michael O’Keeffe, Marlins Closer Leo Nuñez, aka Juan Carlos Oviedo, One 
of Many MLB Players With Fake Name: Expert, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Oct. 6, 2011, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/marlins-closer-leo-nu-ez-aka-juan-
carlos-oviedo-mlb-players-fake-expert-article-1.960202.  
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deal only between the buscón and the prospect, sometimes, school and 
hospital personnel are also involved.113
In an effort to counter the issues of age and identity fraud, MLB 
started using genetic testing on Latin American players.114 MLB would 
require a player to pay for the testing and would reimburse him only if 
the results matched the information on his documentation.115 However, 
the passing of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(GINA) called into question the legality of MLB’s use of genetic testing 
in its investigations.116 In addition to making it illegal for employers to 
use genetic information to make decisions about employment, GINA also 
prohibited employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing a 
potential or current employee’s genetic information, or that of his or her 
family members.117 Despite the mixed views on MLB’s use of genetic 
testing, it did enable MLB to identify multiple players who falsified their 
documents, which ultimately saved baseball clubs millions.118
 113. Hoynes, supra note 110; OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, supra 
note 56, at MLR(3)(a)(1)(F) (stating that “[a]ny player found to have violated this [r]ule . 
. . shall be declared ineligible to sign with any Major or Minor League Club for a period 
of one year, if the player does not have an approved contract with a Major or Minor 
League Club, or shall be placed on the Disqualified List for a period of one year, if the 
player does have an approved Minor League Uniform Player Contract with a Major or 
Minor League Club. The Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee shall have the 
discretion to reduce the mandatory sanctions described in this [r]ule . . .  only if the 
Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee concludes that extraordinary 
circumstances exist that call for the exercise of such discretion. . . . Any person employed 
by or affiliated with any Major or Minor League Club who participates in, aids or abets 
any violation of this Rule 3(a)(1)(F) shall be subject to such sanctions as may be deemed 
appropriate, in the discretion of the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee”).  
 114. Pompeo, supra note 107, at 628. 
 115. Michael S. Schmidt & Alan Schwarz, Baseball’s Use of DNA Raises 
Questions, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/sports/ 
baseball/22dna.html?_r=0.  
 116. Pompeo, supra note 107, at 629–30.  
 117. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: Gina and Your Job,
http://ginahelp.org (last visited April 25, 2017)(employees and their families are 
protected under this Act regardless of their citizenship).  
 118. See Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 115.  
714 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.3 
1. Fausto Carmona of the Cleveland Indians 
On January 19, 2012, Roberto Heredia Hernández, better known as 
Fausto Carmona, was arrested in Santo Domingo for using a false name 
and birth date when he tried to apply for a visa using the false identity.119
Hernández, a pitcher for the Cleveland Indians, reportedly changed his 
name in 2003, and listed his birthdate to appear three years younger.120
According to a representative for the Indians, the team was unaware of 
Hernández’s true identity and age when it first signed him in 2000.121
The then general manager for the team admitted that thorough 
background investigations were not conducted during that time.122
Consequently, the Indians placed Hernández on a restricted list,123 which 
meant that the team conveniently did not have to pay his multi-million-
dollar salary until he was allowed to join the team in the United States.124
2. Miami Marlins Reliever Formerly Known as Leo Nunez 
Juan Carlos Oviedo, commonly known as Leo Nunez, was arrested 
and charged with using a false identity on official documents in 
December 2011.125 Oviedo was arrested in the Dominican Republic when 
he was attempting to apply for a visa under his real name.126 In an effort 
to receive more money, and at the insistence of a coach, Oviedo assumed 
the identity of a friend who is a year younger.127 Apparently, Oviedo was 
 119. Tyler Kepner, Baseball’s Identity Fraud Problem May Be More Prevalent,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/sports/baseball/identity-
fraud-among-dominican-players-worries-baseball- officials.html.  
 120. Id.
 121. Hoynes, supra note 110.  
 122. Id.
 123. Restricted List, BASEBALL REFERENCE, http://www.baseball- 
reference.com/bullpen/Restricted_list (defining restricted list as a category of players 
who have been suspended from organized baseball, but are not free agents. By placing a 
player on a restricted list, the team retains its rights to the player if and when he or she 
becomes active again).  
 124. Kepner, supra note 119. 
 125. See O’Keeffe, supra note 111. 
 126. Id.
 127. Id.
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able to convince MLB of this identity from 2008 to 2011.128 Despite this 
and Oviedo’s refusal to come forward in 2008 when MLB offered 
amnesty to foreign-born players, the Miami Marlins were still assisting 
Oviedo in obtaining proper U.S. documentation.129 Oviedo was later 
released and not charged because of his cooperation in a larger 
investigation, which lead to the arrest and prosecution of the man who 
helped Nunez falsify his documents.130
iii. 2014 Age and Identity Investigations 
During the summer of 2014, the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated the smuggling 
of Cuban baseball players into the U.S.131 The investigations, also known 
as Operation Safety Squeeze and Operation Boys of Summer, initially 
targeted smugglers, financiers, and the handlers that assisted in the 
smuggling rings in its initial stages.132 The investigations centered on 
whether MLB teams and office officials had willfully ignored the 
criminal activity that enabled teams to sign Cuban players.133 Agents also 
investigated whether club officials and employees played a more direct 
part in the smuggling of Cuban players, such as by funding the 
smuggling operations or paying smugglers for the opportunity to connect 
with players.134 Over the course of these investigations and since, MLB 
and its franchises have maintained that they are simply innocent 
bystanders who have no involvement with the smuggling operations that 
deliver the players to their field.135
 128. Associated Press, Miami Marlins’ Leo Nunez Apologizes, ESPN (Dec. 9, 
2011), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/ id/7336000/miami-marlins-leo-nunez-apologizes-
using-fake-name-age.
 129. O’Keeffe, supra note 111.  
 130. Associated Press, supra note 128.  
 131. Scott Eden, Federal Investigations into Cuban Smuggling, Major League 
Baseball Slow, ESPN (Aug. 7, 2015), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/ 
13383092/homeland-security-fbi-agents-look-major-league-baseball-cuban-player-
smuggling-slowed.
 132. Id.
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
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B. Inequality of Bargaining Power 
The U.S. has deep ties with Latin America, both culturally136 and 
economically.137 As a whole, Latin American countries have made 
substantial progress by expanding relations with other countries, 
spreading democracy, and mobilizing more of the population.138
However, individual countries have failed to significantly reduce poverty 
and inequality.139 Consequently, these are areas of major concern to Latin 
American governments and citizens.140 Baseball recruitment is a 
reflection of the economic and inequality status of some Latin American 
countries.141
While high school athletes in the U.S. occasionally relocate for more 
exposure,142 Latin American athletes are happy to relocate to be taken 
care of and get an education while learning a skill with great earning 
potential.143 Despite the increase in the annual per capita income over the 
last decade, the projected increase in the unemployment rate in Latin 
America144 places young players and their families in idle bargaining 
 136. See generally Yesenia D. Acosta & G. Patricia de la Cruz, The Foreign Born 
from Latin America and the Caribbean: 2010, AMERICAN CMTY. SURVEY BRIEFS (Sep. 
2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-15.pdf (stating that as of 2010, 
those who were born in Latin America account for more than half of the total foreign-
born population).  
 137. See Charles E. Noyes, United States Trade with Latin America, in EDITORIAL 
RESEARCH REPORTS 1939, at 257–74 (1939), available at 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1939101000. 
 138. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S.-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS: A NEW 
DIRECTION FOR A NEW REALITY xi (2008) (assessing the changes of U.S. policy toward 
Latin America).   
 139. Id.
 140. Id. at xii. 
 141. See Ruck, supra note 68.  
 142. See generally Greg Howard, So Who’s This Andrew Wiggins Kid? An 
Explainer, DEADSPIN (Nov. 8, 2013) http://deadspin.com/so-whos-this-andrew-
wiggins-kid-an-explainer-1456392439 (noting that Canadian basketball player Andrew 
Wiggins transferred to a high school in the United States for more competition).  
 143. See JAMAIL, supra note 88, at 102.  
 144. Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean Could Rise 0.2 
Percentage Point, INT’L. LABOUR ORG. (May 13, 2015), http:// www.ilo.org/global/about-
the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_368315/lang--en/index.htm (stating that “[t]he 
stagnation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita should weaken labour demand 
and, therefore, the creation of salaried employment. For that reason, a decline in the 
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positions.145 Supporters of MLB’s recruiting practices in Latin American 
countries like the Dominican Republic contend that American baseball 
affords the players an opportunity to provide significant financial 
assistance to their families.146 While baseball can make a positive impact 
from a financial perspective, the players, many of whom are children 
when they become first involved with baseball scouts and clubs, are not 
afforded the same protection as their American counterparts.147
Exploitation is rooted in an inequality of bargaining power.148 The 
basis for determining each party’s power in a negotiation relies more on 
the dependence of each party on the other, rather than how powerful each 
party purports to be.149 This power typically involves a relationship 
where it flows from the more dependent party to the less dependent 
party.150 In addition to assessing alternatives, which afford the parties 
leverage, a more accurate power calculus also considers what each party 
can offer and do to the other.151 Professor Richard Shell called these 
powers “positive leverage” and “negative leverage.”152 For the purposes 
of this article, “negative leverage” will not be discussed. Positive 
leverage, which is needs-based, arises when one party has the ability to 
satisfy the other’s needs.153 Given the economic position of most Latin 
American prospects, baseball scouts and teams have an obvious leverage 
region’s urban employment rate—which refers to the relationship between the employed 
population and the total number of people who are of working age—is forecast for a third 
consecutive year”).  
 145. See Regalado, supra note 8.  
 146. Diana L. Spagnuolo, Swinging for the Fence: A Call for Institutional Reform 
as Dominican Boys Risk Their Futures for a Chance in Major League Baseball, 24 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 280 (2003).  
 147. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 420.  
 148. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 264 (1996).  
 149. Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing 
with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 4, 20 (2000).  
 150. Id. at 19.  
 151. Id. at 20.  
 152. Id.; see also G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION 
STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 6 (1999) (defining a negotiation as “an interactive 
communication process that may take place whenever we want something from someone 
else or another person wants something from us.”).  
 153. Adler & Silverstein, supra note 149, at 20.  
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when negotiating contracts.154 The rules and regulations governing the 
recruitment of Latin American players have created an opportunity for 
these players to be exploited.155
C. Exploitation  
For Latin American recruits, American baseball provides shelter, and 
a salary potential that would be unattainable otherwise.156 However, this 
is overshadowed by the treatment many receive prior to their enrollment 
in MLB academies.157 As early as their preteen years, baseball prospects 
are trained by buscónes, who may encourage these children to forgo a 
formal education to focus on baseball full-time.158 Unlike players in the 
U.S., Latin American players are not encouraged to have a backup plan 
in case a professional team does not recruit them.159 Because MLB does 
not contract with buscónes and it purportedly has no official relationship 
with them, MLB and its affiliates do not regulate buscónes’ dealings with 
the players.160 The buscón system, which is essentially unstructured and 
unregulated, exposes recruits to shady, opportunistic scouts.161
Historically, a buscón would work with one major league team to 
hunt, train, and develop promising athletes, and direct them to that 
team.162 Despite the absence of an official relationship, major league 
teams often paid buscónes a finder’s fee or commission if they signed the 
player.163 From an economic perspective, the buscón system is efficient 
in that it allows major league teams to thoroughly scout Latin American 
 154. See Regalado, supra note 8 (discussing the neocolonialism tradition of 
recruiting Latin American talent). 
 155. See id.
 156. Spagnuolo, supra note 146.   
 157. Dustin Williamson, Part of the Team: Building Closer Relationships Between 
MLB Teams and Independent Agents in the Dominican Republic Through an MLB Code 
of Conduct, 2 N.Y.U. J. OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 369, 371 (2013).  
 158. Id.
 159. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 423–26.  
 160. See Williamson, supra note 157, at 371.  
 161. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 422–23.   
 162. See ARTURO J. MARCANO GUEVARA & DAVID P. FIDLER, STEALING LIVES:
THE GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL AND THE TRAGIC STORY OF ALEXIS QUIROZ 37 (2002).  
 163. Id. at 38. 
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countries for promising talent, at minimal costs.164 Further, unlike sports 
agents, a buscón’s representation of a player ends at signing.165 Once 
negotiations have commenced, the buscón is focused on the signing 
bonus.166 If negotiations are successful, the player typically pays the 
buscón a percentage of the bonus, which sometimes totals as much as 50 
percent.167
The exploitative system surrounding the recruitment of Latin 
American players is rooted in the inequality of bargaining power 
between the players and major league teams, and fostered by MLB’s 
ineffective regulations and investigations of the paths that lead the 
players to its doorstep.168 The 2012–2016 Basic Agreement represented a 
major shift in attitude regarding MLB’s recruiting practices in Latin 
America.169 However, how the system continues to function suggests that 
MLB is not equipped to effectively regulate this area.170 When Bay Area 
Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO) was initially investigated, threats of 
legislation spurred MLB to seriously consider its issue of players using 
steroids, and implement an effective drug testing policy.171 Regulation 
developed by the joint efforts of MLB and government that governs 
MLB’s recruiting practices in Latin America may have the same positive 
effect. 
V. REGULATION FOR THE BUSCÓN SYSTEM IN LATIN AMERICA
As a matter of interdependence between Latin America and American 
baseball, MLB is in the unique position to counteract corruption, and 
curtail conduct that is detrimental to the general welfare of the game.172
 164. Id. at 39. 
 165. Id.
 166. Id.   
 167. Id. at 38.   
 168. See id.
 169. SAMUEL O. REGALADO & SARAH K. FIELDS, SPORT AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL
AND CULTURAL INTERSECTIONS 127 (2014).  
 170. See generally Eden, supra note 131.  
 171. See Michiko Kakutani, Barry Bonds and Baseball’s Steroids Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2006), http:/www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/books/ 
23kaku.html?n=Top%2FFeatures %2FBooks%2FBook%20Reviews.  
 172. See PAUL C. WEILER, GARY R. ROBERTS, ROGER I. ABRAMS & STEPHEN F.
ROSS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 9 (5th ed. 2015).  
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However, MLB’s casual attitude toward policing itself suggests that it 
has no real interest in improving its practices,173 and thus, government 
involvement is warranted. While this attitude may be the result of years 
of preferential treatment from U.S. courts and Congress,174 past 
investigations imply that MLB is not totally out of the federal 
government’s reach.175
For the most part, the connection between Latin American recruits 
and professional baseball is initially developed through buscónes because 
they are able to access players earlier than allowed under MLB’s rules.176
Despite the controversial nature of the buscón system and MLB’s denial 
of an official relationship, buscónes save MLB time and money by 
supplying it with players who have been training in academies since they 
were twelve years old.177 While MLB may not have direct involvement in 
the controversy, it has been an enabler by having knowledge of 
buscónes’ wrongdoings and doing nothing to discourage it.178
A. Building on Past Attempts at Regulating the Buscón System  
In 2004, the Dominican Republic government sought to regulate 
buscónes in an effort to combat recurring issues of exploitation and 
fraud.179 In addition to limiting buscónes’ fees, the law would also 
require them to register with the government with the potential to lose 
their license for illegal behavior.180 Further, the law would limit the 
duration of the contracts that players could sign so to limit the amount 
players would have to pay buscónes.181 Although the legislation did not 
specifically mention an age requirement, it is likely that it would 
discourage training children under a certain age because buscónes would 
 173. See Marcano & Fidler, supra note 11.   
 174. See generally Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof. 
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 207, 209 (1922). 
 175. See Eden, supra note 131.  
 176. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 420, 422.  
 177. Id. at 421.  
 178. See Marcano & Fidler, supra note 11.  
 179. ‘Buscones’ que se las Buscan, ESPN DEPORTES,
http://espndeportes.espn.go.com/nota?id=228769 (last updated Apr. 30, 2004) 
[hereinafter 2004 MLB Problems & Solutions].  
 180. Id.
 181. Id.
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be unable to receive payment for any time outside of the contract.182
While the bill was passed, the regulation was not enforced.183
The 2009 Alderson Report (“the Alderson Report”) suggested that 
MLB develop a plan to urge the Dominican Republic government to 
enact and implement legislation that regulates buscónes’ conduct and 
imposed heavy fines on violators.184 The Alderson Report also proposed 
a collaborative effort between the Office of the Commissioner and 
lobbyists in the Dominican Republic in preparation of the legislation and 
discussions about it.185 Third, the Alderson Report suggested that the 
Office of the Commissioner requests the assistance of the U.S. Embassy 
in the Dominican Republic for any assistance the U.S. government could 
provide.186 Finally, the Alderson Report recommended that MLB’s 
Department of Investigations (“DOI”) create an electronic database that 
contained biographical and business information on each buscón that 
registered.187
Possibly one of the main reasons why the 2004 law was not effective 
is due to lack of incentive for MLB and buscónes and that it disfavored 
MLB club owners.188 The market for Latin American talent is primarily 
created through buscónes and supported by MLB.189 If MLB refused 
recruits from buscónes, buscónes would have no real financial 
incentive.190 Thus, while the main focus should be on protecting Latin 
American players, legislation should also be drafted in favor of 
maintaining the financial incentives of MLB and buscónes.191 Given that 
MLB is a large part of the Dominican Republic’s economic revenue, it is 
 182. See id.
 183. Memorandum from Sandy Alderson to Comm’r Selig Bob DuPuy, at 8 (Sep. 
23, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Alderson Report].  
 184. Id.
 185. Id.
 186. Id.
 187. Id. (stating that some of the legislations provisions regulated other aspects of 
MLB conduct, which was not in MLB’s best interest); Zimmer, supra note 56, at 425 
(stating that “the establishment of Major League Baseball as a largely autonomous 
enterprise with an internal legal system has given it the ability to act solely with its own 
interests in mind; what is most profitable for the League has become the status quo”).  
 188. 2009 Alderson Report, supra note 183, at 8.  
 189. See Ruck, supra note 68. 
 190. See id.
 191. See 2009 Alderson Report, supra note 183, at 8. 
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in a favorable position to influence government decisions.192 To ensure 
both interests are acknowledged, the Dominican Republic government 
should form a committee consisting of mostly government officials and 
personnel from the Office of the Commissioner.193 This would reduce the 
chances of unfavorable legislation for MLB and ultimately, buscónes.194
Registration under the current law should require the same 
information suggested for the proposed database in the Alderson 
Report.195 Specifically, the database should include information on which 
players and teams are working with which buscónes.196 The database 
could also be used to track any complaints made about a buscón’s 
conduct, which will assist the government in conducting 
investigations.197 For buscónes, mandatory registration would level the 
playing field amongst them for access to player and team information.198
For MLB, a database would assist teams in determining which buscónes 
to work with when recruiting.199 Alternatively, registration could be 
voluntary, as suggested in the Alderson Report.200 Voluntary registration 
should require adherence to strict standards, and violators would be 
removed in order to protect the integrity of the database.201 To encourage 
registration, the Dominican Republic government could implement a tax 
break for buscónes and MLB club owners or provide funding for player 
development.202
An expected criticism is that a new Dominican Republic government 
regulation would intrude on another facet of private business practices.203
However, a collaborative effort on the part of the Dominican Republican 
 192. Zimmer, supra note 56, at 425.  
 193. See 2009 Alderson Report, supra note 183, at 10.  
 194. See id. 
 195. Compare 2004 MLB Problems & Solutions, supra note 179, with 2009
Alderson Report, supra note 183, at 10.  
 196. See 2009 Alderson Report, supra note 183, at 5.  
 197. Id. at 8.  
 198. See id. at 5.  
 199. Id. at 9.  
 200. Id. at 8.  
 201. See id.
 202. See 2004 MLB Problems & Solutions, supra note 179; see also 2009
Alderson Report, supra note 183, at 8.   
 203. See Tibor Machan, Government Regulation of Business: The Moral 
Arguments, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (1988).
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government and the Office of the Commissioner will lessen the 
likelihood of resistance.204 The government’s role will be neither novel 
nor overpowering.205 Legislation regulating the buscón system was 
passed in 2004.206 Furthermore, the proposed legislation is more statutory 
oversight than a complete federal takeover.207
B. Regulating Baseball Academies and Emphasizing the 
Importance of Education   
The government is the primary institution responsible for remedying 
the education system in Latin American countries.208 In addition to 
funding, it is responsible for the quality of education received by 
students.209 For example, in the Dominican Republic primary education 
is free and compulsory; however, it is basic by western standards and 
students are not prepared to continue to the next level of education.210
Even though students can attend college for free, few students from 
poorer areas manage to complete the prerequisite education levels.211
Although an increase in government spending on education suggests the 
prioritization of education,212 when compared to baseball, it is not a main 
priority for Latin American youth.213
 204. See About Us: Mission Statement, EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES:
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, http://santodomingo.usembassy.gov/about-us.html (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2016) [hereinafter U.S. Embassy].  
 205. See Machan, supra note 203.  
 206. See 2004 MLB Problems & Solutions, supra note 179.  
 207. See Machan, supra note 203.  
 208. See Alejandro Chafuen, Educational Quality and Inequality in Latin America, 
FORBES (Nov. 11, 2014, 11:11 AM), http//:www.fobes.com/sites/alejandrochafuen/ 
2014/11/20/educational-quality-and-inquality-in-latin-america/ #279dl846224.  
 209. Jaclyn Ambrecht, Education in the Dominican Republic, BORGEN MAG. (Jul.
2, 2014), http://www.borgenmagazine.com/education-dominican-republic/.  
 210. Education System in the Dominican Republic, FOREIGN CREDITS,
http://www.classbase.com/countries/Dominican-Republic/Education-System (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2016).  
 211. Id. 
212. LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2010, DEVELOPMENT CENTRE OF THE 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dev/americas/latinamericaneconomicoutlook2010.htm.  
 213. See Zimmer, supra note 56, at 431.  
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In Latin America, baseball academies are either owned by MLB 
teams or operated independently by buscónes.214 The primary purpose of 
the academies is to hone players’ skills and prepare them to acclimate to 
life in the U.S.215 Additionally, academies run by MLB teams provide 
education-based programs that help prepare players for life after their 
baseball careers.216 Academies operated by buscónes do not have the 
same resources, and thus, cannot provide players with the same quality 
of education.217 Although academies owned by MLB teams answer to the 
Office of the Commissioner, there is currently no regulation in place that 
governs baseball academies ran by buscónes.218
In regard to baseball academies, the Alderson Report primarily 
focused on the issues of age and identity fraud.219 However, it was 
Alderson who introduced the idea of an education initiative, which MLB 
implemented in 2010.220 In addition to hiring a full-time educational 
coordinator, MLB commissioned a study to analyze the educational 
programs and challenges of the different MLB team academies.221
Recently, MLB had a workshop at which representatives from MLB 
team academies met with MLB employees in the Dominican Republic to 
discuss possible educational programs.222 The workshop successfully 
enabled MLB to identify several goals aimed at improving the 
academies’ educational standards and ways to implement the changes.223
Academies run by buscónes should be encouraged to implement a similar 
education initiative.224
The education initiative for academies ran by buscónes should begin 
with a required curriculum.225 Given the poor quality of education 
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 215. See id.
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received by prospects in buscón-operated academies, the curriculum 
should be developed by the government.226 Despite baseball academies’ 
status as private institutions, meaning the government does not fund 
them, there should be strict education standards to which all academies 
must adhere.227 While primarily the government should determine the 
required subjects, MLB personnel and representatives from MLB team 
academies could provide a different perspective on educating 
ballplayers.228  In addition to courses on English, reading, writing, 
general life skills, computer skills, and adapting to life in the U.S., the 
curriculum should include courses on mathematics, history and 
science.229 The purpose of these courses is to produce well-rounded 
athletes, which will ultimately lead to better prospects and players for 
MLB.230 The government and MLB can partially fund these programs.231
Buscónes will be incentivized by the increased likelihood of their 
players’ success.232 For its academies, MLB should prohibit teams from 
recruiting players who have not finished high school, as is the rule for 
players in the U.S.233
Considering MLB’s ability to provide recruits with an education and 
the age of recruits when they come to the academies, education should 
take priority.234 Recruits should spend the majority of the day in classes 
and a few hours a day practicing or doing team workouts.235
Alternatively, courses could be held on certain days, while practices 
could be held on others with a break during the week or weekend.236
 226. See id.
 227. See id.
 228. See id.
 229. See id. The curriculum should be similar to that in an American school. MLB 
team academies could also add these courses to their curriculum.  
 230. See generally Isiah Thomas, Education of Athletes Is Crucial and Goes Far 
Beyond What the NCAA/APR Tell Us, HUFFPOST SPORTS (June 13, 2013, 3:49 PM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/isiah-thomas/education-of-athletes-is-_b_3437013.html; see 
also Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Young Athletes, a Degree Matters, ESPN (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/ story/_/id/8344785/young-athletes-degree- matters 
(discussing how education prepares athletes for life outside of sports).  
 231. See Ambrecht, supra note 209.  
 232. See GUEVARA & FIDLER, supra note 162, at 37. 
 233. See First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, supra note 102.  
 234. See, e.g., Education Initiative, supra note 220.  
 235. See generally Zimmer, supra note 56.  
 236. See generally id. 
726 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.3 
Additionally, the contracts players sign when they enter the academies 
should include a provision regarding school performance.237 Fortunately, 
MLB and the government have the resources to provide players with the 
tools to succeed both physically and academically.238 Thus, poor 
performance in school should result in less time in practice.239 If the poor 
performance continued, the player should face suspension, or possibly 
expulsion.240
C. Curtailing the Problems of Age and Identity Fraud  
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. increased 
border security, which led to discoveries that several players from Latin 
America had falsified their documents.241 However, despite this, MLB’s 
identity fraud problem is unabated.242 Although the background 
investigations conducted have been more thorough in recent years, which 
have led to clubs saving money, there are still many players who receive 
millions in a signing bonus, and are later determined to have falsified 
their documents.243 Consequently, the players are unable to obtain a visa 
to enter into the U.S., and the clubs are unable to get any return on their 
investment in the players.244
VI. THE EARLIER, THE BETTER: AGE AND IDENTITY FRAUD IN 
BASEBALL ACADEMIES
In an attempt to get more organized, MLB began registering prospects 
a few years ago at its showcases.245 Typically, initial registration 
 237. See Education Initiative, supra note 220. 
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generally includes name, age, and basic contact information.246 This 
information, which is probably not verified by MLB, is usually used to 
send prospects and their families general information and news about 
MLB.247 Although it helps MLB to track prospect registration, because 
players’ initial exposure to professional baseball begins with training at 
academies, MLB should verify age and identity starting then, when the 
information is probably more concrete.248
The Alderson Report recommended that recruits be required to 
register with MLB’s Dominican Republic Office (“DRO”) upon their 
first point of contact with an MLB team, which is typically an invitation 
to tryout at an academy, but could also be the negotiation between a 
player’s buscón and a team.249 This policy would prohibit MLB teams 
from inviting a recruit to an overnight stay or multiple-day tryout, or 
engaging in contract negotiations, until the recruit registered with the 
DRO. The Alderson Report also suggested disallowing players who were 
suspended for falsifying their age and identity from participating in 
tryouts held during their suspension.250 Additionally, the Alderson Report 
recommended that players and buscónes sign a declaration attesting to 
the player’s age and identity and that no individual or organization was 
paid anything of value in connection with the registration or signing.251
Players’ biological information should be collected and stored in a 
central database and they should be required to bring proper proof of age 
and identity when they first register with an MLB team..252 As there have 
been instances when a hospital or school has been involved in age and 
identity fraud, the required documentation should come directly from 
either a hospital or school with proof of the documents’ authenticity.253
Schools and hospitals should be subject to penalties for any participation 
in age and identity fraud.254 All of this information, including players’ 
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photographs and fingerprints, should be stored in a database, accessible 
by the Dominican Republican government, the DRO, and MLB teams.255
Players suspended for falsifying their age and identity should be 
subject to suspension for a minimum of a year.256 In addition to 
disallowing them from participating in tryouts, players should also be 
subject to a reinstatement fee.257 The reinstatement fee would be paid to 
the DRO and split between it and the government.258 Players who are 
repeat offenders should be ultimately placed on a banned players list.259
Prior to being placed on this list, players must appear in a hearing before 
the DRO, which they would have agreed to do in an arbitration 
agreement signed when they registered.260 From there, players would be 
able to challenge an unfavorable decision to the Office of the 
Commissioner.261 Should it be determined that the player was rightfully 
suspended or banned, MLB teams should be prohibited from recruiting 
or negotiating with these players, and subject to fines for any violation.262
Realizing that registering all players and maintaining a database 
presents possible budgetary issues, MLB should consider sharing the 
cost.263 In addition to fees recovered from violators, funding could also 
come from MLB teams and the U.S. Embassy.264 The purpose of these 
procedures is to decrease of the instances of age and identity fraud.265
Implementation of these procedures benefits MLB teams by saving them 
millions by not signing players who have falsified their documents.266
Conducting these investigations early on and maintaining the database 
enables the U.S. Embassy to build on prior investigations and focus more 
attention on the higher ups involved in the fraud.267
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VII. AGE AND IDENTITY SHOULD BE VERIFIED PRIOR TO SIGNING A 
PLAYER: AN ALTERNATIVE TO VERIFYING AT FIRST CONTACT
While the U.S. Embassy acknowledged the improvement of MLB’s 
age and identity fraud investigations, it still expressed concern in regard 
to the quality of MLB’s investigations.268 The Alderson Report suggested 
that investigations into players’ age and identity be conducted prior to 
them signing their contract.269 It further suggested that the DOI head age 
and identity fraud investigations in the Dominican Republic, and that the 
Office of the Commissioner assign an in-country lead investigator.270
A. The Department of Investigations 
The DOI is primarily responsible for investigating MLB policy and 
rule violations.271 Within the DOI, there is a unit specifically assigned to 
investigate age and identity fraud, drug use, and kidnappings of major 
league players and their families in Latin America.272 In 2014, Assistant 
U.S. Attorney Bryan Seeley, took charge of the DOI and focused its 
attention on accusations of illegal drug use.273 While the restructuring of 
the DOI led to the development of close working relationships between 
DOI personnel and prosecutors, there was no indication of age and 
identity fraud investigations.274 Since MLB desires to discipline and 
sanction those who violate its policies, but has no legal authority to 
charge violators or make prosecutors bring charges, a relationship that 
fosters collaborative investigations between the DOI and local law 
enforcement should be developed.275 In an effort to effectively tackle the 
 268. See 2009 Alderson Report, supra note 183 at 4. 
 269. Id. at 5. 
 270. Id. at 4. 
 271. Jim Molony, MLB Launches Dept. of Investigations, MLB (Jan. 11, 2008), 
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/2343864/.  
 272. Teri Thompson & Christian Red, MLB Hires New Top Cop With Ties to 
Washington D.C., N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/mlb-hires-new-top-ties-washington- article-
1.1927209.
 273. Id.
 274. See id.
 275. See id.
730 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.3 
issues of age and identity fraud, the DOI should consider dividing the 
interest and creating a separate unit to focus on age and identity fraud.276
B. U.S. Embassy in the Department of Investigations 
The clear question is whether MLB teams and officials willfully 
ignore the criminal activity players and prospects participate in to get a 
chance to play in the majors.277 The next question is who is financially 
backing this activity.278 Considering that government officials expressed 
support of MLB improving its operations in the Dominican Republic, 
which is echoed in other Latin American countries,279 government 
officials would likely support the DOI following guidelines set by the 
U.S. Embassy for investigating age and identity fraud.280 Alternatively, 
U.S. Embassy personnel could take an active role in investigating age 
and identity fraud alongside the DOI or have the DOI’s investigators 
report directly to the U.S. Embassy.281 The Alderson Report suggests that 
investigators should be subjected to extensive background and integrity 
checks.282 The U.S. Embassy should do these checks, and the U.S. 
Embassy personnel conducting the checks should be anonymous.283 As a 
final check, investigators in the U.S. Embassy and the DOI should be 
subject to federal prosecution for any participation in the age and identity 
fraud of those they investigated.284
C. Joint Committee  
As of yet, MLB has not matched its ambitious plans with committed 
actions. While MLB has implemented rules and formed committees, the 
rules have proven to be futile and the committees appear inept in 
developing a new culture of habits that discourage the exploitation and 
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manipulation of Latin American athletes.285 Baseball committees 
typically consist of members who represent the interests of the 
Association and the Clubs.286 Since these parties are not necessarily 
concerned with the best interest of international athletes and corruption 
in regard to policy compliance appears to be a constant impediment, a 
joint committee should be formed. 
A joint committee consisting of representatives from the Players’ 
Association, the Clubs, and the U.S. Embassy in the Dominican Republic 
would allow Major League Baseball to focus its attention on the major 
issues surrounding the recruitment process in Latin America. The 
purpose of the U.S. Embassy in the Dominican Republic is to align the 
continued development of the Dominican Republic with the interests of 
the United States.287 In regard to MLB’s international recruitment 
process, the U.S. Embassy is in the unique position to conduct in-depth 
investigations, while maintaining a diplomatic front.288 Additionally, 
because the U.S. Embassy has regular contact with local government, 
businesses and nongovernment organizations,289 it can ensure 
representation of local interests in the development of new MLB 
policies. This approach would promote a sense of trust between the 
parties and facilitate positive responses to the changes.  
D. Expanding the Draft to Include International Players 
For Latin American countries, an international draft would mean that 
Latin American players would be eligible for selection alongside their 
American counterparts, or that MLB would hold a separate draft 
altogether.290 In either system, Latin American players would no longer 
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be free agents.291 In recent years, there has been growing anticipation 
regarding whether MLB will have an international draft.292 In 2013, MLB 
decided against holding an international draft because it and the MLBPA 
could not reach an agreement about the logistics and procedures related 
to an international draft.293 MLB is to revisit discussions of an 
international draft at the expiration of the 2016 CBA.294
Proponents of an international draft argue that an international draft 
will support a competitive balance because it would put all players in the 
same pool regardless of their country of origin.295 Prior to the current 
CBA, MLB and MLBPA agreed to an international bonus system that 
restricted the amount of money teams could spend on international 
recruits.296 Although violators of this restriction were subject to fines, the 
continued spending by teams suggests that money is not a deterrent.297
Critics of having an international draft state that it would only be 
applicable in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela because those are 
the primary interests MLB focuses on in considering whether to have an 
international draft.298 Further, critics believe that the two countries would 
want to protect a system that has resulted in consistent economic 
revenue.299
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MLB should implement an international draft when the current MLB 
expires at the end of this year and include only players born outside of 
the U.S. and Canada.300 Although this would result in the loss of Latin 
American players’ free agency status, they would be aligned with talent 
from the U.S. and Canada.301 In addition to providing a necessary 
structure around the recruitment of Latin American talent, implementing 
an international draft would also force much needed transparency.302
The financial impact an international draft may have is uncertain.303
From a Latin American player’s perspective, an international draft may 
offer advantages in negotiating his signing bonus.304 Given the 
negotiations’ visibility, as compared to the semi-closed negotiations with 
free agents, fans will likely apply pressure on MLB teams because they 
are invested in contract negotiations with their player.305 When 
negotiating the logistics of an international draft, parties must be sure 
that international players’ bargaining positions are not frustrated by 
impositions placed on MLB teams.306
VIII. CONCLUSION
Baseball is a game of tradition. As so, MLB has been reluctant to 
make changes, even in the face of a known exploitative system.307
However, as baseball continues to expand globally, MLB will face new 
challenges that cannot be met with the same lackadaisical attitude as with 
past issues.308 MLB’s recruiting practices in Latin America include the 
complexities of international and sports law, as well as a contested 
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relationship between a multi-national corporation and impoverished 
people.309
The exploitative nature of MLB’s recruiting practices in Latin 
America is not vindicated by MLB’s aggressive plans to change.310 MLB 
is more than equipped and has had ample opportunities to counter its 
unfair treatment of Latin American players. These issues require action, 
and MLB’s reluctance to change suggests either it is more committed to 
tradition than righting its wrongs, or that it is inept to face these 
challenges alone.    
Despite the criticisms of government involvement in private business 
practices, government involvement of MLB recruiting practices in Latin 
American countries will not only hold MLB accountable to certain 
standards, but also provide structure to a system that is effectively 
unregulated.311 With speculation of an international draft, the soon 
expiration of the current of CBA, and relations between the U.S. and 
Cuba reopening, MLB has a lot to consider when negotiating the next 
CBA.312 It is important that MLB prioritize revamping its recruiting 
practices in Latin America.  
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